Conventional macroeconomic theory is based on the idea that demand shocks can only have temporary effects on unemployment, however several European economies display highly persistent unemployment dynamics. The theory of hysteresis points out that, under certain conditions, demand disturbances can have permanent effects. We find strong evidence of unemployment hysteresis in advanced economies since the 1990s. Relying on an identification scheme instigated by an insider/outsider model, we exploit the heterogeneity in impulse responses to demand shocks to investigate what labor institutions soften or amplify these responses. Our results indicate that strengthening labor institutions that promote a faster adjustment of real wages, removing disincentives for firms to hire and for workers to be employed, and improving the matching between labor supply and demand can lessen the effects of adverse demand shocks and lead to a faster reversion of unemployment rates to pre-shock levels.
Introduction
Conventional macroeconomic analysis is based on the idea that demand shocks only have temporary effects on unemployment. Since Friedman (1968) articulated the natural rate hypothesis, it became standard to think about the unemployment rate as a stationary variable reverting to its natural rate, without any possibility for actual unemployment to affect its natural rate. In reality, however, unemployment rates proved very persistent. In a review of unemployment dynamics in 20 developed countries, Ball (2009) finds that large increases in the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) are associated with monetary tightenings. These findings suggest that demand shocks can lead to persistent effects in the NAIRU and, therefore, in actual unemployment rates. While most standard models incorporating nominal rigidities and matching frictions predict some persistence in the deviations of unemployment from its natural rate (see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt 2016) , in many cases output losses appear somewhat closer to permanent rather than persistent Chaman Saxena 2008, 2017) .
In a seminal paper, Blanchard and Summers (1987) reconcile the empirical evidence of path-dependent unemployment rates with the theory by arguing that wage bargaining in a context of strong unions reflect the interest of the insiders and can result in permanent effects of demands shocks, a phenomenon they label as hysteresis. They themselves recognize that this argument is too strong, but other mechanisms can generate hysteresis. 1 Layard and Nickell (1987) , for example, point out that a longer unemployment duration may lead to disenfranchising through skill loss, less interest of firms in hiring, and discouragement, effectively reducing the relevance of long-term unemployed workers in the wage formation process. This in turn, would exacerbate the persistence in unemployment rates and, in the words of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) , "possibly even halting" the return to lower unemployment rates. Also, Blanchard (2018) notes that if a slowdown in economic activity is associated with lower spending on research and development, total factor productivity may be permanently lower as a result of a smaller "stock" of past research and development efforts.
But how relevant is the theory of unemployment hysteresis? Research on hysteresis has been somewhat neglected since the Great Moderation, but persistent unemployment rates in many European countries and the permanent output losses in the aftermath of the GFC revamped the discussion (Ball, DeLong, and Summers 2014; Coeuré 2017) . Galí (2015) tests the relevance of the hysteresis hypothesis by taking "seriously" the nonstationarity of the unemployment rate in the euro area, and investigating its sources and empirical plausibility through the lens of a New-Keynesian framework. He finds that while the natural rate hypothesis cannot explain the patterns observed in the data, the hysteresis hypothesis can account for the stability of wage inflation together with nonstationary movements in the unemployment rate during the post-1994 period. 2 The literature also emphasized that labor market institutions play a major role in determining unemployment duration, including by softening or amplifying the effect of demand shocks (Thomas and Zanetti 2009; Zanetti 2011a) . For instance, better coordination in bargaining could be reflected in a faster adjustment of real wages to shocks, thereby reducing hysteresis. On the other hand, if bargaining mostly reflects the interests of a specific category of workers (e.g. prime-age workers), it would lead to little sensitivity of wages of any other category (e.g. young workers) to their unemployment. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) show that unemployment duration can be longer when unemployment benefits are generous and labor taxes increase, while Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) analyze the role of unemployment benefits and employment protection policies when demand shocks hit, reaching similar conclusions. At the empirical level, there is no clear-cut evidence. Some key contributions to the literature include Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) , that conduct an empirical analysis of the interactions of common shocks to unemployment and labor market institutions and find that they are crucial to explain the heterogeneity in unemployment dynamics and their persistence across Europe; and Nunziata (2002) and Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) , that do not find robust evidence for the role of the interactions between shocks and institutions. 3 In this paper, we first test and argue that unemployment dynamics can be approximated by unit root processes in most of the 23 advanced economies in the sample since the 1990s. We then rely on this finding to identify aggregate demand shocks to unemployment through a modified version of the insider/outsider model of and Amisano and Serati (2003) , which, in our version, does not restrict demand disturbances to have zero long-run effects on unemployment. Finally, we estimate the impact of these shocks allowing for cross-country heterogeneous dynamics in the context of a panel structural vector autoregressive (PSVAR) model, and in a second-stage we exploit such heterogeneity to investigate what institutional settings have the potential to soften or amplify the effects of demand shocks. We find strong evidence of unemployment hysteresis, raising skepticism about the natural rate hypothesis. 4 Our results also provide suggestive evidence that the generosity of unemployment benefits, labor taxation, union density, and more coordinated wage setting bargaining amplify the impact of demand shocks; while incentives for specific categories of workers to look for employment, such as the diffusion of part-time employment, the length of maternity leave, higher statutory retirement age, more generous pension systems, more migrant-friendly policies, as well as higher spending on active labor market programs (ALMP) curb these effects.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework used for the shock identification. Section 3 illustrates a list of stylized facts suggesting that unemployment rates in advanced economies tend to be very persistent. Section 4 presents a two-stage empirical strategy which relies on the restrictions implied by the theoretical model and uncovers the interaction effects between shocks and institutions. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical setup
The framework here adopted draws from Blanchard and Summers (1987) , , and Amisano and Serati (2003) . It consists of an aggregate demand equation:
where real GDP, y t , depends on real aggregate demand, (d t − p t ), and productivity, θ. It also features an aggregate supply equation of the following form:
where real GDP depends on labor, n t , and productivity. Prices are set in line with wages, w t , adjusted for productivity:
In turn, wages are set to obtain a certain level of expected employment, , that is a function of the previous level of participation, l t−1 , the previous level of employment, n t−1 , as well as a wage push factor, (as in Amisano and Serati 2003) , and a wage pull factor, (our addition to the model):
where the wage push factor is a function of the institutional settings likely to increase wage sensitivity to demand shocks, such as, but not limited to, unemployment benefits and labor taxes, and the wage pull factor is a function of the labor market institutions that operate in the opposite direction, such as, but not limited to, part-time employment and ALMP:
where the terms Z t and S t are vectors of N and M variables, respectively, proxying institutional settings. 5 In the model of Blanchard and Summers (1987) , the parameterization of λ depends on the union density in the labor market. In settings with strong unions, wage decisions are "likely to give little weight to the interests of unemployed members and less to the interests of non-members", effectively assigning a smaller weight to the outsiders (i.e. low λ). In contrast, in non-unionized settings, incumbent workers have some bargaining power owing to low fixed costs and worse re-employment prospects, which is reflected in a higher weight to outsiders (i.e. high λ). 6 Hence, if unions are sufficiently strong, wages are set unilaterally to make expected employment equal to current employment, = , generating full hysteresis, as any shock to employment will have permanent effects with no tendency to return to the pre-shock employment level. When outsiders have some bargaining power, λ increases producing partial hysteresis.
Including a wage push factor in equation (4) can amplify (or reduce) the extent of hysteresis. The mechanism at work can be clarified with an example. In a country with strong unions and high unemployment, unions would negotiate for higher wages to protect insiders and the authorities may decide to increase unemployment benefits. This would strengthen the unions' efforts to protect the insiders by increasing the wage push factor , which would result in an outcome approaching full hysteresis. As noted by Amisano and Serati (2003) , introducing a wage push factor is akin to have a time-varying λ. The same mechanism operates for the wage pull factor. In a country with low union density and high unemployment, increases in public spending on ALMP would lead to a higher wage pull factor . This, in turn, would be reflected in a higher level of expected employment and lower wages. The outcome would then be characterized by partial hysteresis. More generally, one could easily think of other possible scenarios in which the decisions of the authorities about the wage push and pull factors lead to full or partial hysteresis.
Finally, we specify the labor supply equation as:
where current labor force participation is linked to (expected) real wages, − ; past unemployment, u t−1 through the discouragement effect, b; the wage push and pull factors, and ; and τ t is a stochastic disturbance. 7 Having specified real wages and labor force participation in equation (4) and equation (7) as functions of the wage push and pull factors has the advantage of allowing for interactions among the institutions of equation (5) and equation (6), in the spirit of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) .
As a last step, we specify the disturbances to supply, demand, and labor force participation as random walk processes:
where the shocks , , and , are effectively productivity, aggregate demand, and labor supply shocks. 8 We solve the model for real wages, real output, and unemployment, which yields the following equations:
Equation (11) suggests that the unemployment dynamics depend positively on the discouragement effect, the impact of past employment on wages, and the wage push factor; and negatively on the wage pull factor. Compared to the framework of , for any given value of b, full hysteresis is not limited to the case in which λ = 0. In fact, the presence of the wage push and pull factors can re-produce a persistent behavior of the unemployment rate. While this setup suggests that real wages depend solely on productivity shocks, an assumption on the role of aggregate demand and labor supply shocks has to be made by analyzing the stationarity properties of the unemployment rates. On the one hand, if the unemployment rate is I(0), we can assume that aggregate demand shocks do not have any long-run effect on real output, which is consistent with the natural rate hypothesis. 9 On the other hand, if the unemployment rate is I(1), aggregate demand shocks do have an impact on real output in the long run, and labor supply shocks are the ones with no long-run effect on real output. It is therefore critical to assess the persistence of the unemployment rate to opt for the appropriate identification strategy.
Stylized facts 3.1 Unemployment persistence
A visual inspection of unemployment rates in 23 advanced economies since 1990s reveals a great deal of persistence. As shown in Figure 1 , most of the economies in the sample show persistent swings in the series with limited mean reversion. Over a number of quarters ranging between 61 and 114 depending on data availability across countries, the lines denoting the unemployment rates cross the lines representing the country-specific means less than four times on average. On the other hand, changes in unemployment rates appear stationary around their mean. To further appreciate the strong persistence of unemployment rates, we plot the autocorrelation coefficients in Figure 2 . The coefficient remains statistically different from zero for a minimum of one and a half years up to about two and a half years, indicating the random walk nature of the unemployment series. The persistence, however, might have varied over time. For instance, changes in institutional settings could have favored a more or less dynamic adjustment of unemployment to shocks. To explore this possibility, we run a rolling panel regression of unemployment on its lag (as well as on country-and time-fixed effects) and plot the coefficient over time. Figure 3 shows that the coefficient hovers around one for the length of the sample. In the few periods for which the coefficient is statistically different from one, the point estimate never falls below 0.9, confirming that the average country displays a unit root process for the unemployment rate. We now move to perform formal unit root tests for unemployment. Table 1 reports the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic including the intercept as well as including the intercept and a trend component, both for the level of the unemployment rates and the changes. 10 Introducing a trend is particularly relevant here, as one may argue that the persistence in the unemployment rates is due to the long-term trend associated with (unfavorable) demographics for this group of advanced economies. Thus, we want to be able to argue for nonstationarity after controlling for a trend. 11 For the great majority of the advanced economies in the sample, the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root process cannot be rejected. When including the trend, only in the case of Finland, Netherlands, and Sweden the results suggest that the unemployment rate is stationary. In the case of Greece, Ireland, and Latvia, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10 percent significance level for the changes in the unemployment rate, indicating some level of persistence even for that. The lag structure is based on the Schwartz information criterion. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
One could argue that structural breaks (caused, for example, by the implementation of structural reforms) might contaminate the results of the unit root tests indicating that, in most cases, unemployment series are non-stationary. To deal with that possibility, we perform the test by Zivot and Andrews (2002) , which allows for the existence of unknown structural breaks. The results in Table 2 support the conclusions obtained from the ADF tests, namely that there is evidence of non-stationarity in unemployment rates for the great majority of the countries in the sample. The lag structure is based on the Schwartz information criterion. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
These results pointing to a strong persistence in the unemployment series are not new in the literature. and Galí (2015) , for example, come to similar conclusions, but note the power of the conventional unit root test is impaired when samples are finite. As a way to circumvent the limited power of the ADF-type tests, we perform a second set of unit root test relying on the Johansen (1991) framework for cointegration testing. In line with , we specify a vector autoregression in levels including real wages, real output, and unemployment plus an unrestricted linear trend. If we reject the null hypothesis that there are no cointegrating vectors, and cannot reject both that the number of cointegrating vectors is one and that the cointegrating vector has the form [0, 0, 1] for [(w − p), y, u], then we conclude that u is I(0) while the other variables are I(1), with no cointegration among the variables. On the other hand, if we cannot reject that the form of the cointegrating vector is [(w − p), y, u], we conclude that u is I(1). The results reported in Table 3 confirm the presence of a unit root for most advanced economies. In the case of Denmark, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and the United States, however, the I(0) nature of the unemployment series cannot be rejected. Interestingly, there is no match between the results across the two unit root test approaches. As a way to obtain summary results for the panel of countries, we perform panel unit root tests. Given that the degree of persistence can change by country in line with the institutional settings, we employ tests that allow for heterogeneous parameters, i.e. Im, Hashem Pesaran, and Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999) . 12 The results in Table 4 confirm that unemployment rates are not stationary, while changes in unemployment rates are. Based on this evidence, we conclude that some shocks seem to trigger permanent effects in unemployment rates. The lag structure is based on the Schwartz information criterion. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Empirical strategy and shock identification
The fact that institutional rigidities causing unemployment hysteresis can be more pervasive in some countries than in others suggests that there is no reason why one should expect to observe the same degree of persistence in the response of unemployment to aggregate demand shocks. Rather, cross-country responses are likely to display different dynamics. To deal with this complexity, in the first stage of the analysis we employ the heterogeneous PSVAR model of Pedroni (2013) , which relaxes the usual assumption of homogeneous dynamics among the members of the panel. 13 Beyond unveiling the heterogeneous dynamics, we are also interested in identifying which institutional features determine the severity of the shock. To do that, we take advantage of the distribution of the unconditional responses of the unemployment rates (with respect to the possible factors that determine hysteresis) to shocks in aggregate demand estimated with the heterogeneous PSVAR, and run a second-stage regression of these estimated responses on a wide set of institutional variables. We now discuss more formally the first stage of the analysis. We model the dynamic relationship among these variables with a heterogeneous PSVAR of the following form:
where z i,t is a vector of (demeaned) endogenous variables: the log of real wages, ( , − , ) − (̄−̄); the log of real output, , −̄; and the unemployment rate, , −̄. A i (L) = is a lag polynomial allowing for country-specific lag lengths according to the usual information criteria. The subscripts i = 1, …, N t and t = 1, …, T i on the time and cross-section dimensions take into account that the panel may be unbalanced. Compared to Amisano and Serati (2003) , we do not include any institutional variable intentionally. 14 In this respect, our empirical strategy is more similar to the one of Balmaseda, Dolado, and David Lopez-Salido (2000) as our aim is to estimate unconditional responses to the shocks and recover the correlations with the wage push and pull factors in a second stage. Specifically, we estimate a set of N reduced-form VARs, one for each country:
and we recover the country-specific structural shocks from the reduced-form residuals, , = −1 , . As noted in Blanchard and Summers (1987) , when the unemployment rate is I(1), equation (4) becomes = { = −1 }. Thus, show that in this case Δ , = ( ) , translates into the following expression with identifying restrictions on the long-run structural coefficient matrix R i (1):
Under this identification scheme, aggregate demand shocks are allowed to have a permanent effect on both real output and unemployment, consistent with the I(1) properties discussed in Section 3. 15 Real wages, in turn, are only determined by productivity shocks in the long run, in line with a constant returns to scale assumption for the production function. Finally, labor supply shocks have no permanent effects on output, as it remains solely determined by productivity and aggregate demand shocks. By unconditionally estimating the heterogeneous PSVAR with respect to the institutional characteristics, the impulse response function (IRF) coefficients will contain information about the role played by the same institutional factors in determining the impact of aggregate demand shocks on unemployment. Hence, we take advantage of the heterogeneous nature of the methodology in a couple of ways. First, we compute descriptive statistics for the cross-sectional distribution of the structural responses, R i (L), including the median, mean, and interquartile ranges, to present representative impulse responses for the heterogeneous dynamics in our sample. Second, we run a second stage regression to identify which institutional settings (or wage push and wage pull factors) are more likely to be associated with large responses of the unemployment rate to shocks in aggregate demand. Formally, we estimate the following cross-section equation:
where Y i,h is the response of unemployment to aggregate demand shocks for country i at horizon h. π h denotes the horizon-fixed effects. X is a vector of proxies for: institutional settings commonly associated with unemployment hysteresis, including union density and coordination of wage setting; policies that could change the incentives for firms to hire and for workers to be unemployed, such as labor taxation and unemployment benefits; programs that improve the matching between labor supply and labor demand, measured as public spending on ALMP (e.g. training programs and job-search assistance); and other institutional settings that could make it easier for specific categories of workers to look for employment or remain employed, such as the friendliness of migration policies, part-time employment, the length of maternity leave, the statutory retirement age, and the generosity of the pension system. While it is difficult to argue that institutional characteristics are exogenous to the size of the unemployment fluctuations and therefore to interpret the results in a casual manner, we still believe that this approach can provide preliminary insights about the interactions between shocks and institutional settings. Figure 4 presents the median, the average, and the 25 th and 75 th percentile cumulative responses of the endogenous variables to productivity, aggregate demand, and labor supply shocks. Showing the distribution of the IRFs is particularly informative as it provides information about the extent to which countries with different institutional settings display evidence of hysteresis. We start the discussion of the results from the real wage responses. Productivity shocks increase real wages both in the short and long run, however the dispersion around the mean is sizable, with the effect for the 75 th percentile being about 2.5 times the one for the 25 th percentile. In the case of an aggregate demand shock, the average response of real wages is counter-cyclical, however the magnitude of the median effect is only one third of it, and the response for the 25 th percentile reveals that for a quarter of the countries in the sample the effect is positive. 16 Finally, labor supply shocks tend to have a positive effect on real wages, but similar to the case of aggregate demand shocks, the effect is dispersed with a quarter of the sample showing a negative effect.
Results

Heterogeneous PSVAR
With respect to the real output responses, the short-run effect is positive for all shocks. Consistent with the restrictions imposed, the effect of a labor supply shock converges towards zero over the long run. In the case of a productivity shock and an aggregate demand shock, the effect is persistent, even though it displays a much larger cross-country variation for the productivity shock.
Finally, we look at the unemployment responses. Differently from and Amisano and Serati (2003) that employ an identification scheme based on the partial hysteresis hypothesis, the median responses show persistence for all shocks. In the case of a productivity shock, however, the effect is dispersed across countries, with over one quarter of the sample displaying a zero effect. The response to an aggregate demand shock -our focus in this paper -is large, negative, and persistent, suggesting strong hysteretic effects. A one standard deviation increase in aggregate demand is associated with a fall in the unemployment rate by about 0.6 percentage points after two years for the median country. It should be noted, however, that the effect is dispersed, with half of the countries in the sample exhibiting a response ranging between about 0.4 and 1 percentage points.
We now assess the statistical significance of the median responses. Figure 5 shows the median responses together with the bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals. All the median responses discussed so far are statistically significant. To complete the first stage of the analysis, we evaluate the relevance of each shock in explaining the variability of the unemployment rates. To do so, we rely on the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) shown in Figure 6 . The left panel shows that, on average, 70 percent of the variability in unemployment rates is due to labor supply shocks in the short run, followed by aggregate demand shocks with 20 percent, and productivity shocks with 10 percent. However, as time goes by, the proportion of unemployment variation explained by aggregate demand shocks increases and reaches about 40 percent one year and a half after the shock. This increase is mostly offset by a fall in the variation associated with labor supply shocks. Once again, we analyze the crosscountry distribution of these results. In the mid panel, we plot the median and the interquartile range of the proportion of unemployment rates' variability due to aggregate demand shocks. The results suggest that there is little difference between the mean and the median, and that for half of the sample aggregate demand shocks can explain between 30 and 50 percent of total variability in unemployment rates in the long run. Finally, in the right panel we show the bootstrapped 95 percent confidence interval for the median contribution of aggregate demand shocks to the unemployment variance, which confirms that it is statistically different from zero. 
The role of labor market institutions
There are many institutional characteristics that can possibly determine the extent to which unemployment rates react to aggregate demand shocks, or, in other words, prevent unemployment rates to revert to pre-shock levels. We assess the role of these institutional factors by using the IRF coefficients as a dependent variable and regressing them on the variables proxying institutional settings. 17 IRF coefficients, however, vary period by period, implying that no single horizon provides an unambiguous measure of the size of the responses. Using a cross-horizon average is complicated by the fact that we have only 23 countries in the sample (i.e. 23 IRF coefficients at any given horizon), and only for a subset of these we have data for the institutional proxies, making statistical inference challenging. To address this, we pool all IRF coefficients together and run a panel regression using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent (HAC) standard errors, as well as the weighted least squares (WLS) estimator with the inverse of the IRFs' squared standard error as weights. 18 Table 5 reports the regression results. The estimated coefficients present signs that generally go in the expected direction. We find that higher labor taxation, generous unemployment benefits, restrictive migration policies, and strong unions seem to amplify the effects of aggregate demand shocks; while higher spending on ALMP curbs the effects of aggregate demand shocks on unemployment. Also, incentives for specific categories of workers, such as the diffusion of part-time employment, the length of maternity leave, higher statutory retirement age, and more generous pension systems help limiting the impact of aggregate demand shocks on unemployment. The only counter-intuitive result is the one for coordination of wage setting, which seems to amplify the effect of the shocks, possibly because of inefficiencies associated with a coordinated approach. 
Robustness
We perform a battery of robustness checks. For the countries where the null hypothesis of non-stationary unemployment rate is rejected in Table 3 , we run VARs using an identification scheme consistent with the natural rate hypothesis (i.e. assuming no long-run effects of aggregate demand shocks on unemployment rates and real output). As shown in the left panel of Figure 7 , the average and median dynamics are very similar to the ones presented in Figure 4 . In the mid panel of Figure 7 , we report the IRFs of the countries for which we reject the hypothesis of unit root in Table 3 . Despite the different identification strategy, Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, and the United States show very persistent effects of aggregate demand shocks on unemployment, lasting about three and a half to over five years and eventually converging to zero due to the identification restriction. In the case of the United Kingdom, the effect turns surprisingly positive. 19 Also, we make the extreme-and-againstevidence assumption that all countries have stationary unemployment rates and impose restrictions consistent with no permanent effects of aggregate demands shocks on unemployment. Even under such restrictions, the results suggest that the median IRFs take four years to die out, as shown in the right panel of Figure 7 . Finally, we present the results of the second-stage regressions of specific time horizons in Table 6 . Unsurprisingly, the coefficients are imprecisely estimated due to the reduced number of observations. However, the signs of the coefficients are the same as in Table 5 , and the magnitudes are broadly consistent. In some cases, even with such reduced number of observations, some coefficients turn out significant. This is the case of unemployment benefits, restrictiveness of migration policies, share of part-time employment, job-protected maternity leave, statutory retirement age, and public spending on old-pensions. 
Conclusions
How persistent are unemployment rates? Can policymakers act to make demand shocks less severe and hence favor a faster reversion to pre-shock levels of unemployment? In this paper, we address these questions in the context of an insider/outsider model. Specifically, we adapt a modified version of the model of Blanchard and Summers (1987) and similar to the one employed by and Amisano and Serati (2003) to obtain identification restrictions consistent with persistent unemployment rates. We then estimate the impact of demand shocks on unemployment rates and use the cross-country heterogeneity to explore what institutions help soften or amplify the effect of demand disturbances. We find strong evidence of unemployment hysteresis, with demand shocks showing persistent effects on unemployment. The analysis of the cross-country unemployment responses provides suggestive evidence that disincentives for firms to hire and for workers to be employed (such as labor taxation and unemployment benefits), and impediments to a quick adjustment of real wages (proxied by union density) amplify the effects of demand shocks. At the same time, programs that improve the matching between labor supply and demand (proxied by public spending on ALMP) and incentives for specific categories of workers to look for employment or remain employed (such as the diffusion of part-time employment, the length of maternity leave, higher statutory retirement age, more generous pension systems, and more migrant-friendly policies) curb the effects of demand shocks on unemployment. In sum, our results suggest that strengthening labor market institutions can lead to less severe effects of demand shocks on unemployment and therefore a faster reversion to pre-crisis unemployment levels.
Our empirical findings also highlight the need for further research to embed persistent changes in unemployment in theoretical models. In this spirit, Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2017) and Pizzinelli, Theodoridis, and Zanetti (2018) develop frameworks in which labor market fluctuations are state dependent, showing that different unemployment regimes can arise endogenously in standard search and matching models with and without endogenous job separation, and where the effect of labor market reforms is different across phases of the business cycle.
Notes 1 Blanchard (2018) notes that even if the insiders do not care about the outsiders, they still risk to become unemployed if economic conditions deteriorate, hence they might accept lower wages, especially if unemployment is high. Also, high levels of unemployment strengthen the bargaining position of firms at the moment of hiring, as they can draw from a larger pool of candidates. 2 Galí (2015) also notes that the long-run trade-off hypothesis can account for the secular rise in unemployment during the 1970s and 1980s. 3 A full literature review is beyond the scope of the paper. 4 Galí (2015) and Blanchard (2018) , among others, come to similar conclusions. 5 For a discussion on how labor market institutions affect wages see Pissarides (2000) and Zanetti (2011b) . 6 If unemployment is low and fixed costs to hire outsiders are also low, new firms may hire outsiders generating competition in the goods markets and lowering wages. If unemployment is high, re-employment prospects are gloomier for workers if laid off, forcing insiders to accept lower wages. In this case, however, insiders may harass the outsiders as replacing the whole labor force is not likely to be cost effective (Lindbeck and Snower 1986) . 7 As in Amisano and Serati (2003) , we model current labor force as a function of expected real wages rather than actual real wages and past unemployment rather than contemporaneous unemployment, providing a better characterization of how long-term unemployment strengthens the bargaining position of the insiders. 8 In this framework, oil price shocks are captured in negative productivity shocks, which increase prices (thereby lowering real wages) and raise unemployment. 9 Galí (2015) shows that the natural rate hypothesis cannot account for the patterns of unemployment and wage inflation observed in the euro area between 1970 and 2014. Specifically, the strong persistence in unemployment cannot be reconciled with a mean reverting behavior implied by the theory.
